The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of an imperfect but contractible performance measure. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make and buy. The performance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense of being subject to manipulation. The performance incentives faced by the agent are stronger in the "buy" regime. A positive (negative) impact -or "externality" -of manipulation on true performance favors make (buy).
Introduction
The distinction between "make" and "buy" may seem too obvious to attract attention by laymen. While this may reflect reasonable judgment, the scientific endeavor of illuminating the distinction and understanding the forces that determine real-world make-or-buy decisions is a fundamental one.
The undertaking attempted in this paper is to develop a simple principalagent framework within which the distinction between employing an agent (make), and hiring an independent agent (buy) arises endogenously and can be parameterized in such a way that a direct comparison can be made. The approach springs from two strands of literature. First, it builds on the assumption that there are limits to contracting, thus adhering to the literature on incomplete contracts by assuming that assets -and the residual revenue streams generated by assets -cannot be subject to elaborate sharing contracts. Secondly, it maintains that there are substantive contingencies that can sustain incentive contracts; in this we build on comprehensive contracting theory in focusing on the incentives created by such contracts.
Specifically, the "true outcome" of the project undertaken in the model belongs to the owner of an underlying asset, contracting on which is plagued by incomplete-contracting limitations. At the same time, there exists a performance measure derived from the true outcome but subject to manipulation by the agent; this measure can be the basis for a comprehensive contract. Having set out and justified this framework, we first note that performance incentives are always stronger for an independent agent and that the agent's risk aversion plays the expected role of favoring employment. We then go on to ask the question how variation among activities in terms of manipulability and the impact of manipulation of the performance measure can guide the make-or-buy decision.
A simple example Consider as a specific example the provision of services by (local) government bodies. Government contracting provides an important and relatively transparent testing ground for make-or-buy choices, and many services are indeed run in-house and by contracting in parallel. Bus services, specifically, is an activity where monitoring of quality seems reasonably manageable and cost-control issues thus are at center stage. This is a case where the model developed in this paper is clearly applicable. According to standard theory, the principal -i.e. the government body -should write a cost-sharing contract with the agenti.e. the party responsible for providing the bus service -in order to share risk. In the case of an in-house service, the principal would reward the agent for low realized costs, and in the contracting case, the principal would share some of the agent's realized cost at the margin. In the absence of imperfections, moreover, the sharing arrangements would be equivalent in the two cases. Ï n practice, however, principals seem to face a rather dichotomous choice between employing an agent on a cost-plus basis and hiring a contractor at a fixed price. Empirically, the absence of performance-based compensation within government bodies is pervasive, and Franciosi (2000) demonstrates how bus services in Arizona are contracted on an almost complete fixed-price basis in spite of the existence of obvious indicators proxying costs. We provide an incomplete-contracting justification for this distinction between regimes. Residual returns are indivisible and accrue either to the principal or to the agent, and the agent is assumed to be able to manipulate the measured outcome. An agent working under a cost-plus contract with a performance bonus would then have an incentive to suppress measured costs, whereas an agent working under a fixed-price contract with cost-sharing would have an incentive to inflate measured costs. It is well known that the former case will make the principal attenuate the incentives faced by the agent (pushing the contract towards a pure cost-plus contract) to limit manipulation, and it follows by the same logic that the principal will reduce the extent to which costs are shared in the latter case (pushing the arrangement towards a pure fixed-price contract).
Background Leading sources of insight into the make-or-buy decision are transaction-cost economics, and the property-rights approach. 1 A key conclusion is that activities involving two parties for whom specific investments in a relationship are important are more likely to be integrated by one of the parties; the reason is that the party making a specific investment under non-integration is more likely to be subject to "hold-up" by the other party, undermining incentives to make specific investments. 2 The key assumption within the property-rights approach is that contractual incompleteness (due ultimately to unforeseen contingencies) makes all contracts renegotiable. This makes the parties' payoffs depend on renegotiation bargaining, where the outside options affect the outcome; parties therefore spend resources investing in their outside options. Ownership of assets -ownership giving residual control rights -determines the payoffs in disagreement (i.e. the outside options), as well as the sensitivity of those payoffs to investments. Under plausible assumptions, this creates incentives to overinvest in outside options and to underinvest in relationship-specific capital. The allocation of ownership of assets can be used to ameliorate the underinvestment problem.
While the property-rights approach is conceptually convincing, it suffers from the weakness that contracts are reduced to merely benchmarks for renegotiation; this effectively rules out the use of explicit incentive schemes that are clearly often important in practice. 3 The importance of incentive schemes, moreover, depends on the measurement and contractibility characteristics of the activity subject to the make-or-buy decision, which are analyzed in the comprehensive-contracting literature. Baker (1992 Baker ( , 2002 , Holmström and Milgrom (1991 and 1994) , and Holmström (1999) have devised models where performance measures are manipulable and/or multi-dimensional. 4 Set-ups in the same spirit as ours -generating a regime discontinuity in contracting by appealing to incomplete contracts -have been suggested by Holmström and Milgrom (1991, Sec. 3.3) and Gibbons (2005) . Both papers develop examples in multi-task contexts, whereas our approach is to consider a single-task framework with manipulability and to provide a more complete analysis of this framework. The single-task framework is salient as a basic model in many applications, and by narrowing the analysis we can pursue empirical and normative implications for regime choice further.
There is some literature dealing directly with the manipulability of performance measures. The focus of this literature is the limits that manipulability imposes on incentive provision, and it is generally concluded that manipulability does, indeed, limit the feasibility and the desirability of strong explicit incentives; this is true e.g. in Crocker and Slemrod (2007) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) and this point is also made in Baker (1992) . 5 As far as we know, however, no work in this tradition explores the implications of the fact that the object of manipulation may 3 Interestingly and importantly, there is a recent development of the property-rights approach stressing "contracts as reference points" (Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart, 2008) . The focus of this literature, however, is on behavioral implications of the contract in place for renegotiation. If, e.g. a party is unhappy with the outcome of renegotiation (relative to a reference point influenced by the contract), that party may engage in "shading" performance. 4 There is, moreover, empirical work indicating that measurement aspects are important for explaining the make-or-buy decision: In their work on in-house versus independent sales forces, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson (1985) found measurement-related explanatory variables to stand out most strongly.
5 There are also instances of work exploring more indirect implications of manipulability; for example, Friebel and Guriev (2005) explore the implications or manipulation in a hierarchy where this gives lower-level managers leverage against their superiors in a way that turns out to undermine incentives. There is also empirical evidence from executive-compensation data of manipulation in the sense of "earnings management" and "financial misreporting" being responsive to incentives; see e.g. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Burns and Kedia (2008). shift with the choice between make and buy.
The related work by Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) builds on the core idea that market incentives sometimes induce too much "signaling effort," i.e. effort to inflate others' assessment of performance without promoting performance per se; they mention schooling and delegated asset management as examples where this may be a significant problem. Their analysis is devoted to exploring why incentives are, in general, weaker in firms and, even more so, in governments, than in markets. 6 Notably, they work in a "contract-free" environment, and hence do not address questions about the properties of actual incentive contracts. Levin and Tadelis (2008) also study the make-or-buy decision by devising a simple theoretical model -driven by contract-administration costs -for generating and testing predictions from contracting by US cities. 7
Basic framework
We will consider a simple linear principal-agent model where the principal has an exogenously given task that she cannot solve by herself. At the other end is an agent, who in the end solves the task; the agent may be thought of as a worker or a subdivision of a firm (make), or as a subcontractor (buy). The agent may exert effort on the task itself on the one hand, and on influencing -manipulating -the performance measure on the other.
The principal, P, is a risk neutral profit maximizer, whose benefit from completion of the task has a fixed component, B > 0, and a variable component that can be thought of as the net monetary outcome.
The agent, A, cares about income, y, and effort. He exerts effort a on the task and he exerts effort d on manipulating the performance measure. He is risk averse, and his utility from income y and effort (a,d) is
6 They consider a career-concerns model with a "good" and a "bad" component of effort; after showing that market incentives may be excessively strong, they argue that firms can remedy this by creating, by design, a moral-hazard-in-teams problem; they also argue that competition between firms allows remnants of market incentives to trickle down to employees, and that this effect can be avoided by governments. 7 Another instance of related work is Tadelis (2002) , who draws on work by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) on fixed-price versus cost-plus contracting in procurement to argue that the complexity of an activity makes "make" a more likely outcome of the make-or-buy decision.
with r A > 0 the agent's level of absolute risk aversion; the specific utility function is assumed for tractability. 8 The agent has reservation payoff u A . Without loss of generality, we will assume that u A = −1.
The agent exerts effort, a, on a task whose outcome -e.g. a measure of realized profits or cost savings -is x given by
where ε is a random variable reflecting the fact that the outcome is affected but not determined by the agent's effort; ε is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v. The contract governing the agent's reward, however, can be based only on a performance measure, z, that is subject to manipulation,
where γ ≥ 0 is a constant; for γ = 0, the problem is completely standard as we will note below. The agent may want to either inflate (d > 0) or deflate (d < 0) performance. Given z's dependence on d and the quadratic cost, either is equally costly.
Contracts are assumed to be linear in the relevant performance measures. 9 That is, y = F + mz
for constants F and m.
Residual income and regimes It is often presumed that incentives "originating in" an organization are weaker than incentives generated in contractual relations between organizations. 10 A core purpose of this paper is to provide some justification for this in a framework where incentive contracts matter. We will make a precise distinction between an employed agent and an independent agent below, and we will refer to the two cases as two regimes, make and buy. The distinction between the regimes arises from output being subject to incomplete contracting, but in contrast to the property-rights approach there is a fully contractible performance measure that approximates output in our framework.
8 As we will note below, one way to introduce interactions into the model would be to consider an interdependence between a and d in the agent's preferences; this was done in a previous version, but here we consider interactions through the technology. 9 The most convincing rationale for linear contracts is provided by Holmström and Milgrom (1987) ; the essence of the argument is that when the agent can adjust effort when observing intermediate result -as modeled sophisticatedly in the paper -non-linearities can be exploited in a way that makes them unattractive. 10 As we have noted, this is a widely shared presumption, articulated e.g. by Williamson (1998) .
Output accrues through an asset that is, at least for practical purposes, indivisible; true performance, x, accrues as the proceeds of the asset and cannot be subject to a sharing contract. The assumptions about the asset are thus in line with the property-rights approach although it plays the sole role of carrying the proceeds of output. 11 An employed agent is defined by the principal owning the asset; the value produced by the efforts thus accrues to the principal, whose payoff is
where z is the available performance measure and where y emp (z) is the remuneration to the agent. An independent agent, on the other hand, owns the asset and the value produced by the effort accrues directly to him; the principal's payoff is then
where y ind (z) is the contracted remuneration to the agent; the agent's income in this case is y ind (z) + x. Note that it may well be the case that ∂y ind /∂z is negative reflecting the principal's risk-sharing with an independent agent; this will in fact always be the case in the specification considered below.
Optimal contracts
We will next go through the analysis of the basic framework in some detail, before enriching the setting in the next section.
An employed agent Consider first the case of an employed agent. The principal solves (where expectations are w.r.t. the distribution of ε) 12
The property-rights approach is presented by e.g. Hart (1995) ; while Hart dismisses unreflected reliance on "residual income" in modeling, he also stresses the point that residual income in most cases and for good reasons goes together with the residual control rights that come with ownership. Importantly, the dynamics that generate investment incentives within the property-rights approach are absent from the model considered here.
12 Using the fact that 
Maximization by the agent yields a = m, and d = γm.
Inserting equilibrium effort, taking logarithms in the participation constraint and substituting, we get an unconstrained problem. 13 Let u P denote the principal's objective function,
which is to be maximized with respect to m; the solutions is, with obvious notation,
The problem generates a value function for P from employing the agent,
giving
We see that the presence of manipulation, as parameterized by γ, weakens direct effort incentives; it is also costly from a welfare point of view.
An independent agent Next, we will consider how the problem is modified if the principal opts for an independent agent. The principal solves, having re-formulated the constraint by taking logarithms and noting that the "reservation certainty equivalent" is zero since u A = −1,
and subject to the agent's maximization. The difference is that actual output enters the agent's rather than the principal's payoff; the agent's incentives to exert a are 13 The participation constraint obviously must bind.
therefore strengthened by the direct effect (and his exposure to the variance is 1+m) while his incentives to exert d are unaffected. Maximization by the agent yields
Note that the key difference between (8) and (14) is the difference in relative price. The direct performance incentive (incentive for a) is stronger relative to the incentive for manipulation (d) with an independent agent; note also that this may well call for m < 0 in the independence case.
Inserting equilibrium effort and solving the constraint as above, the principal maximizes the following objective function:
with respect to m, from which
and from which the effective power of incentives for productive effort, a, facing the agent is
Note that m ind < 0, and that 1 + m ind > m emp ; we will come back to this. The problem generates a value function for P from contracting with an independent agent,
which after some manipulation (elaborated in the Appendix for the more general case), gives
to be compared with u * emp P
. We may note that with increasing importance of manipulation (γ), the slope of the contract is reduced in the sense that m ind decreases, and effective effort incentives, 1 + m ind , are strengthened. Manipulation is costly in the independence case too; the value function is decreasing in γ. 14 14 The derivative of the value function w.r.t. γ 2 is −r 2 A v 2 /2 1 + γ 2 + r A v 2 . 
Comparisons
The above gives rise to a number of substantive comparisons. A key observation is that the framework endogenously and unambiguously generates stronger performance incentives under independence.
PROPOSITION 1. The performance incentives facing the agent are stronger for an independent agent.
Proof. An independent agent faces performance incentives 1 + m ind = 1 + γ 2 / 1 + γ 2 + r A v from (17) compared to m emp = 1/ 1 + γ 2 + r A v from (10) for an employed agent; the difference is
Q.E.D.
A number of additional remarks can be made:
• When γ = 0 and manipulation has no bite, the two incentive schemes are equivalent (1 + m ind = m emp ) and the solutions in the two cases coincide completely.
• It is obvious from the expression for incentives under independence in (16) that m ind < 0. This means that the optimal contract is indeed one of costsharing by the principal.
When it comes to regime choice, we have:
PROPOSITION 2. The principal prefers to contract with an independent agent rather than employing an agent precisely if r A v ≤ 1.
Proof. The condition for an independent management to be optimal is that the difference between the value functions under independence (19) and employment (12) be non-negative:
The condition for an independent agent to be optimal is thus r A v ≤ 1.Q.E.D.
We conclude the discussion of the basic model with some observations about the statement:
• The result of the proposition is quite intuitive -the risk exposure of the agent, measured by 1+m ind and m emp respectively, is unambiguously larger in the independence case. In fact, the result can be seen as a discontinuous version of the standard tradeoff between incentives and risk-sharing.
• The neutrality of regime choice with respect to γ, the impact of manipulation, is non-obvious and clearly a feature of the specific model. One may note, however, that while the cut-off is unaffected, the absolute difference between the value functions is increasing in γ whenever r A v = 1.
• A direct comparison of the slopes of the contracts determining manipulation incentives, m emp in (10) and m ind in (16), shows that optimal regime choice in fact minimizes manipulation; independence is preferred by the principal precisely when m ind < m emp . This feature does not generalize to the cases considered below.
Externalities of manipulation
The above result is too simple in a way. While it conveys a basic trade-off, it is derived in a framework with little interaction between manipulation, which is purely redistributive, and productive effort which determines the outcome. The obvious way to proceed is to allow for interaction between manipulation and productive effort. Such interaction can operate through the agent's preferences and/or through the technology. In the following, we will develop a formulation where the interaction operates through the technology. 15 In modeling terms, we will proceed by adding a term reflecting an externality to the linear formulation for output. 16 In this formulation, the externality affects output; as we will note below, one could also consider the case where the externality affects the principal independently of the regime; we will report that case briefly towards the end of this section, finding that the results are partly similar.
We continue to denote "true output" by x, and we let
where the externality is given by the function, λ(d), weighted by σ. We will consider two functional relationships:
15 In a previous version we pursued the other route; we will comment on this below. 16 The choice of the term "externality" is deliberate, reflecting the notion that manipulation as a primarily redistributive activity affects output in a way that is not directly dealt with by the contract. This terminology is also used by Martimort and Pouyet (2008) in the context of spillovers between the building and the operation of a facility, and the implications for bundling. the significance of each of these specifications will be discussed shortly. The weight, σ , can be positive or negative.
Before going to interpretations, we must extend the definition of the performance measure. We will assume that the performance measure is, similarly to the previous section, given by z = a + ε + γd.
This means that the externality does not affect the performance measure, but this reflects only an accounting convention. 17
Interpretations The introduction of an externality enriches the model in two dimensions, reflected by σ and λ above. The externality of manipulation may be either positive or negative (given by the sign of σ ), and when performance is inflated and deflated, the externality may either work similarly or in opposite directions (the form of λ ); this is a distinction between:
• The case where manipulation is costly (or beneficial) for output in a way that leads to a similar externality if the agent tries to inflate performance (d > 0) or deflate performance (d < 0); in formal terms, this is manifest in the cost of manipulation depending on |d|.
• The case where manipulation has an impact on output that depends on whether the agent tries to inflate or deflate performance; a simple case is that where the cost of manipulation depends on d.
With these distinctions introduced, there are four qualitative combinations illustrated in Table 1 below where we also sketch some examples, to be elaborated below. To build a bit of intuition, we elaborate the four cases.
17 I.e. one could include the externality in the basis for z with no implication for the result. More precisely, re-defining γ = γ − σ , and assuming z = a + ε + σ d + γd gives an equivalent formulation for the case λ (d) = d (expressions would change but the substantive results would be the same); similarly for the other case.
(i) This case applies e.g. when manipulation is a separate activity that is costly in terms of attention stolen from productive effort; this, obviously, may spill over negatively on the value of the asset/revenue stream itself independently of whether the agent aims at inflating or deflating measured performance. (ii) In contexts with cost-based remuneration, the agent can inflate the performance measure by keeping costs at bay; this inflation is an inverse measure of cost-padding. In the basic model we have m emp > 0 and m ind < 0, and an independent agent has an incentive to pad costs whereas an employed agent has an incentive to manipulate costs in the opposite direction. Cost manipulation may, for example, take the form of booking costs of R&D as operating expenditures, and it is clearly possible for cost-padding by such means to have positive externalities on the activity or on the principal; similarly it is possible that there are negative externalities of excessive cost control. We will return to the applicability of this example below. (iii) This case is perfectly analogous to case (ii) except for the externality of inflating performance (corresponding to reverse cost-padding just like in the previous case) being positive. As we mention below, an example would be a case where the agent can transfer costs across competing principals. (iv) This case is probably less common in practice; manipulation is costly but has a positive externality on output independently of sign. 18
Results
We will, recalling that x = a + ε + σλ(d), and that measured performance is z = a + ε + γd, proceed by presenting the key considerations. In order to focus on interesting cases we will assume two bounds on the externality; we assume that:
1. |σ|≤γ, which rules out the externality being the dominant force relative to performance manipulation in the agent's trade-offs concerning d; this is to keep in line with the spirit of the model; and 2. |σ|γ≤1, which guarantees that the marginal returns to manipulation through the externality (from the point of view of the principal) are no larger than the marginal returns to productive effort.
In terms of the two cases -the case where the externality depends on d and where it depends on |d| -the latter is probably more relevant whereas the former is analytically simpler. Within a given range of parameter values, however, the results are identical: PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that the externality depends on d or that the externality depends on |d| and the following parameter restriction is satisfied:
Then an independent agent faces stronger performance incentives, and the principal prefers to contract with an independent agent rather than employing an agent precisely if
The proof is provided in the Appendix. 19 The difference in performance incentives is:
and we see that it grows with a negative externality; the reason is that the principal then needs to reduce manipulation, and thereby productive effort too, downwards for an employed agent (recall that a = m and d = γm in that case). The tradeoff concerning regime choice is illustrated in Figure 1 . As the externality grows in importance (i.e. grows relative to γ), the employment regime grows more attractive in the case of a positive externality, and independence grows more attractive in the case of a negative externality. 20 The value functions are:
and
We see that the importance of the externality (σ ) has a positive second-order effect in the case of independence, reflecting the fact that the agent internalizes the externality, albeit in a second-best fashion, whereas in the case of employment, σ has a first order effect with the sign of σ . The basic intuition for the proposition stems from two forces. On the one hand, an independent agent internalizes the externality; this, obviously, favors independence. On the other hand, however, in the employment regime the basic incentive-vs-risk-sharing problem creates second-best distortions that are reduced when the externality is positive, and aggravated when the externality is negative. More precisely, the constraint on the relative price between productive effort and manipulation makes incentives "positively aligned" in the employment case, and with a positive externality this is desirable. 21 The bound in (25) is somewhat restrictive, and to cover a bit more ground, we have the following extension, which is well in line with the tenet of Proposition 3: PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that the externality depends on |d| and that γ≤1, then for
an independent agent faces stronger performance incentives, and the principal always prefers to contract with an independent agent.
Proof. See the Appendix. The result is simple under the condition that γ ≤ 1 (which is a minor strengthening of |σ | γ ≤ 1 since this is the case where σ is large negative). The condition is sufficient; if γ is larger, independence is optimal under a large critical level of r A v.
We have mentioned the possibility that the externality would always hit the principal, rather than the owner of the asset. We have performed the analysis for this case as well with similar conclusions; the analysis is available from the author. More precisely, the analysis is essentially unaffected for the case where the impact of the externality depends on d. When the impact of the externality depends on |d|, the critical risk exposure stays constant (at r A v = 1) within a range (σ ∈ [−γ, γ/2]); for more strongly positive externalities (arguably the least relevant case) the character of the regime difference changes.
Above, we made reference to a previous version where there was no technological interaction, but where there was a dependence between the two efforts, a and d, in the agent's utility function. In more precise terms, there was a parameter, ρ, measuring the strength of competition between the efforts. 22 The results were similar in so far that the role that the externality plays in this framework was played by ρ in the other formulation (albeit inversely, a positive ρ having the the effect of a negative externality). Intuitively, ρ is then a measure of the severity of the manipulation problem in a way that is akin to that of a negative externality.
Empirical implications
The empirical implications of the framework and the analysis are closely tied to the interpretation of manipulation. In trying to explain the dichotomy between fixedprice and cost-plus contracting, it seems quite reasonable that manipulation is a barrier to sophisticated sharing contracts in many situations in practice. The further conclusion that negative effects of manipulation on productive outcomes make independence more attractive seems quite reasonable.
While the results are similar, the interpretation of manipulation differs a bit between the case where the externality depends on the magnitude of manipulation in terms of absolute value, and the case where it depends on the sign of manipulation effort.
Externality depends on |d| This case is the most straightforward one -the basic interpretation is that manipulation (in spite of being discounted by expectations in equilibrium) diverts attention or resources from the productive activity. 22 Even more precisely, the cost-of-effort function was c(a, d) = a 2 /2 + ρad + d 2 /2; note that for ρ = 1 this is the often-used (a + d) 2 /2 function with perfect substitutability.
On this note, Anderson (1985) makes an interesting observation in the context of explaining the choice between in-house sales people and external representatives. Anderson notes that "But, contrary to expectations, the greater the possibility of the customer developing loyalty to the salesperson, the greater the likelihood of using a representative. " (p. 248) . Loyalty between the salesperson and the customer expands the feasible set of manipulation that is not threatened by whistle-blowing by the customer, and thus plausibly reinforces the potential for negative repercussions on the undertaking and on the principal.
Externality depends on d As we have mentioned above, cost-padding is an instance of manipulation with possible externalities. Cost-padding may take the form of classifying as operating expenses costs that are not intended to be classified as such; in the presence of a contract where the principal shares some of the agents cost on the margin, there is clearly incentives for cost-padding in this sense (amounting to understating performance which is an inverse measure of costs). The relevance of cost-padding in this sense is indicated, for example, in the literature on regulation. 23 To the extent that cost-padding has positive externalities (i.e. overstatement of cost-savings has negative externalities), this favors independence. 24 It is, moreover, easy to find examples where such a positive externality is quite plausible; important examples include activities where there is a desire by the agent to channel resources into R&D-related activities. A specific example in this vein is health care, where cost-inflating elements of insurance-based systems in general -and the U.S. system in particular -are sometimes argued to have benefits in terms of driving technological progress. Whereas it is easy to find evidence of cost-padding in the presence of cost-sharing arrangements, it is harder to find evidence of manipulation involving excessive cost-containment by employed agents. An interesting example, however, can be found in the very case of health care, where public systems with a large proportion of in-house production -such as in Sweden and the United Kingdom -while successful at containing costs, are often accused of excessive rationing and free-riding on innovation and development by other actors. 25 It is clearly conceivable that cost-padding instead has negative externalities. One example of cost-padding with obviously negative externalities is that of an independent agent serving several principals who may be able to transfer costs across principals; the potential for such manipulation obviously makes it less attractive for 23 See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch. 12 ) for a discussion and some examples, and di Tella and Dyck (2008) for recent empirical work. 24 As noted, the results are essentially similar for the case where the externality always hits the principal when it depends on d. 25 The cost relations are illustrated in Sec. 5.2 in OECD (2007); the claims about quality and free-riding are harder to quantify. a principal to contract with such an independent agent. Granted, the driving force behind this example does not have a symmetric in-house counterpart, and there are clearly other candidate-reasons for a principal to be wary of such inter-principal competition, but such considerations do not preclude this mechanism from playing a role.
Dichotomy of regimes One may note that the model by construction, but nevertheless importantly, illustrates that activities with similar external conditions may choose different regimes; a small change in a parameter starting close to the critical value can induce a jump. This is, for example, consistent with the dichotomy observed in the context of franchising. The dichotomy stems from the observation in e.g. retailing and fast-food restaurants that outlets run by an in-house management coexist with franchised outlets, and that the incentives structures differ fundamentally; it is thus clearly a distinction between regimes with features similar to the make and buy features in our framework. The prediction of our model is that the dichotomy is natural given variation in the severity of the externality (σ ) and the measurement problem (γ), and the agent's risk aversion (r A ).
As a final remark we comment on the assumption that parameters -i.e. γ and the specification of the externality -are the same across regimes. Beyond the fact that it keeps the model as simple as possible, it is important to note that the comparative-statics conclusions would not be sensitive to changing the assumption in this regard. For real-world outsourcing decisions, on the other hand, it is clearly possible that parameters differ across regimes. For instance, there may be less room for manipulation under employment which obviously would favor employment ceteris paribus; such a difference would have a natural interpretation in terms of monitoring in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) .
Conclusions
This paper is an attempt to build a simple and parsimonious framework within which the distinction between make and buy -between performing an activity within a firm or organization (employment) and having it performed by an outside (independent) party -arises endogenously. The intended contribution is both in terms of foundation -having set out a set of assumptions that generate two distinct regimes -and in terms of application. In terms of foundation, the framework synthesizes elements from incomplete-contracting and comprehensive-contracting frameworks in a way that is, arguably, conceptually appealing. 26 The driving as-sumption is that the underlying outcome is owned by the principal in the case of an employed agent, but is owned by an independent agent. This implies that the incentives coming from the contract come on top of the direct incentives for an independent agent. The source of the imperfection of the contractible performance measure is the fact that it can be manipulated by the agent, and since manipulation incentives come exclusively from the contract the relative price between productive effort and manipulation differs across the two regimes.
In terms of results, the ultimate incentives for exerting productive effort are always stronger in the independence case; this is in line with systematic as well as casual empirical observation. In terms of application, manipulation possibilities clearly constitute a relevant element in many principal-agent relationships and in the previous section we tried to outline empirical implications.
The relative attractiveness of the two regimes depend on three properties within the model: (i) the joint measure of the risk facing the agent, measured by r A v; (ii) the effect that manipulation has on the underlying performance, termed the externality, its sign and strength being measured by σ; and, (iii) the extent, γ, to which manipulation affects the performance measure. In addition to this, we have considered two specifications of the structure of the externality -its depending on d or |d| -but the basic results have been similar. The principal's choice is between employing an agent or contracting with an independent agent, and the results are quite clear-cut: (i) A higher risk facing the agent makes the choice of an employed agent more attractive. (ii) The externality has a clear implication: a negative externality favors contracting with an independent agent, while a positive externality favors employing an agent. (iii) The sensitivity of the performance measure to manipulation has the effect of moderating the externality; as γ grows, the critical level of risk exposure tends towards one, the value that applies in the absence of an externality. The basic intuition for the results is that while an independent agent generally internalizes the externality in a way that an employed agent does not, this is more valuable in the case of a negative externality since the relative incentives of an employed agent are beneficial under a positive externality.
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider the cases λ (d) = d and λ (d) = |d| in turn.
and subject to maximization by the agent which yields a = m, and d = γm.
Taking logarithms and simplifying the participation constraint we get, using the assumption that u A = −1,
and, substituting the constraint, which obviously must bind
Inserting equilibrium effort, P maximizes
with respect to m; the first-order condition is
follows directly. The problem generates a value function for P,
Next, we will consider how the problem is modified if the principal opts for an independent agent, while still λ (d) = d. The principal solves (again, recall that
the difference is that actual output enters the agent's rather than the principal's payoff and the agent's incentives to exert a are therefore strengthened by the direct effect while his incentives to exert d affected by the externality. Maximization by the agent now yields a = 1 + m; and d = γm + σ.
(A.11)
Substituting the constraint and simplifying a bit, (A.12) and inserting equilibrium effort, the principal maximizes the following objective function:
with respect to m, with first-order condition
from which .15) and from which the effective power of incentives facing the agent is
Next, we compare performance incentives: (A.17) which is positive as long as |σ|≤γ as assumed. In this setting, thus, an independent agent has unambiguously stronger performance incentives. Analogously to the employment case, the problem generates a value function for P, (A.18) and an independent management is optimal if it is no smaller than u * emp P above, i.e. if the following is non-negative: 20 The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 11 [2011] , Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 23 DOI: 10.2202 /1935 -1704 .1790 
This condition can be expressed (A.20) and re-written, 27
The case λ (d) = |d| The employment case is unaffected by the change from λ (d) = d to λ (d) = |d| (since d is always positive) and we thus proceed directly to the independence case.
We are going to use the fact that since |d| = −d when d < 0, we can simply use −d in the analysis as long as we can be sure that d is negative. We will start by assuming d to be negative, and then check when this is valid; we will then explore the remaining cases. The principal solves (suppressing the incentive constraint)
Maximization by the agent now yields
Substituting the constraint and simplifying a bit, the problem is (A.25) and inserting equilibrium effort, the principal maximizes .26) Note that this value function is identical to (A.13), and the same analysis thus applies. 27 One may note that whenever |σ | > γ, independence is optimal since the RHS is postive, while the LHS is negative; for σ = γ, there is indifference. Note that this seemingly entails a discontinuity at σ = γ, but the actual profit difference is zero at σ = γ; the intuition is that the internalization effect then becomes dominant.
Next, we need to look at actual d:
d ind is non-positive if the following lower bound for σ is satisfied:
In order to verify that this is indeed a solution, one must check that there does not exist another solution (superior for the agent) with d > 0 for some parameter values. The analysis relevant for this case was done above with λ(d) = d (which coincides with λ(d) = |d| for d > 0) and we saw that (recalling that m is the same in the two cases) then:
To rule out d > 0 as a solution, this must be non-positive,
providing an upper bound on the externality (we explore the case where this is not satisfied below). In sum, if |σ|≤
d is unambiguously negative under both specifications. Note that this interval expands with r A v; it shrinks to zero when risk vanishes.
Strong positive externality When the externality is strong enough positive in the sense of (A.30) not being satisfied, 28 there are two consistent solutions, with d positive and negative, to the agent's problem, which is (A.33) with solution and value: .34) 28 Note that this, as mentioned in the text, is a rather odd case, a strong positive externality of manipulation independently of the sign of d.
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• Since m < 0 (unambiguously when d > 0 is part of the equilibrium) the latter possibility is obviously superior, and the solution with d < 0 is the relevant one in this case too; i.e. for σ > γr A v/(1+γ 2 +r A v), condition (A.22) applies.
Proof of Proposition 4. We now turn to the final case of a strong negative externality, i.e. σ < −γr A v/(1 + γ 2 + r A v), with λ (d) = |d|. While the result is clear-cut, the argument is a bit technical and we proceed in steps:
Agent's best reply: The agent's objective is In this case, it is harder to obtain a tractable tight bound, and we will provide a sufficient condition for independence to be optimal in this case too. (1 + σ γ) A.50) at the right-hand boundary in (A.49) where σ is just negative enough to give γm ind − σ ≥ 0. When σ turns more negative from that point, two things happen: (i) there is a direct negative effect on u * emp P (since |σ | γ ≤ 1); and (ii) there is a positive effect on u 0 P (m) since the constraint on m is relaxed. Both these effects thus make independence more attractive. If independence is preferred at the boundary, it is thus preferred for all more negative σ ; the condition for independence to be optimal at the boundary is We see that if γ ≤ 1 independence is unambiguously preferable. Note that given that this case concerns σ strongly negative, the condition that γ ≤ 1 is quite weak given |σ | γ ≤ 1. 
